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Abstract
Recently we proposed the linguistic interpretation of quantum mechanics (called quantum and
classical measurement theory, or quantum language), which was characterized as a kind of meta-
physical and linguistic turn of the Copenhagen interpretation. This turn from physics to language
does not only extend quantum theory to classical systems but also yield the quantum mechanical
world view (i.e., the philosophy of quantum mechanics, in other words, quantum philosophy).And
we believe that this quantum language is the most powerful language to describe science. The
purpose of this paper is to describe the Monty-Hall problem and the three prisoners problem
in quantum language. We of course believe that our proposal is the final solutions of the two
problems. Thus in this paper, we can answer the question: ”Why have philosophers continued
to stick to these problems?”And the readers will find that these problems are never elementary,
and they can not be solved without the deep understanding of ”probability” and ”dualism”.
Keywords: Philosophy of probability, Fisher Maximum Likelihood Method, Bayes’ Method, The
Principle of Equal (a priori) Probabilities
1 Introduction
1.1 Monty Hall problem and Three prisoners problem
According to ref. [4], we shall introduce the usual descriptions of the Monty Hall problem and
the three prisoners problem as follows.
Problem 1 [Monty Hall problem]. Suppose you are on a game show, and you are given the
choice of three doors (i.e., “Door A1”, “Door A2”, “Door A3”). Behind one door is a car, behind
the others, goats. You do not know what’s behind the doors
However, you pick a door, say ”Door A1”, and the host, who knows what’s behind the doors,
opens another door, say “Door A3”, which has a goat.
He says to you, “Do you want to pick Door A2?” Is it to your advantage to switch your choice
of doors?
❄ ❄ ❄
Door A1 Door A2 Door A3
Problem 2 [Three prisoners problem]. Three prisoners, A1, A2, and A3 were in jail. They knew
that one of them was to be set free and the other two were to be executed. They did not know
2who was the one to be spared, but the emperor did know. A1 said to the emperor, “I already
know that at least one the other two prisoners will be executed, so if you tell me the name of one
who will be executed, you won’t have given me any information about my own execution”. After
some thinking, the emperor said, “A3 will be executed.” Thereupon A1 felt happier because his
chance had increased from 13(=Num[{A1,A2,A3}]) to
1
2(=Num[{A1,A2}])
. This prisoner A1’s happiness
may or may not be reasonable?
E A1 A2 A3
✲ ✲
“A3 will be executed”
(Emperor)
The purpose of this paper is to clarify Problem 1 (Monty Hall problem) and Problem 2 (three
prisoners problem ) as follows.
(A1) Problem 1 (Monty Hall problem) is solvable, but Problem 2 (Three prisoners problem) is
not well posed. In this sense, Problem 1 and Problem 2 are not equivalent. This is the
direct consequence of Fisher’s maximal likelihood method mentioned in Section 2.
(A2) Also, there are two ways that the probabilistic property is introduced to both problems as
follows:
(A21) in Problem 1, one (discussed in Section 4) is that the host casts the dice, and another
(discussed in Section 6) is that you cast the dice.
(A22) in Problem 2, one (discussed in Section 4) is that the emperor casts the dice, and
another (discussed in Section 6) is that three prisons cast the dice.
In the case of each, the former solution is due to Bayes’ method ( mentioned in Section 2).
And the latter solution is due to the principle is equal probabilities ( mentioned in Section
5). And, after all, we can conclude, under the situation (A2), that Problem 1 and Problem
2 are equivalent.
The above will be shown in terms of quantum language (=measurement theory). And there-
fore, we expect the readers to find that quantum language is superior to Kolmogorov’s probability
theory [15].
1.2 Overview: Measurement Theory (= Quantum Language)
As emphasized in refs. [6, 7], measurement theory (or in short, MT) is, by a linguistic turn of
quantum mechanics (cf. Figure 1: 7© later), constructed as the scientific theory formulated in a
certain C∗-algebra A (i.e., a norm closed subalgebra in the operator algebra B(H) composed of
all bounded operators on a Hilbert space H, cf. [16, 17] ). MT is composed of two theories (i.e.,
pure measurement theory (or, in short, PMT] and statistical measurement theory (or, in short,
SMT). That is, it has the following structure:
3(B) MT (measurement theory = quantum language)
=


(B1) : [PMT ] = [(pure) measurement]
(AxiomP 1)
+ [causality]
(Axiom 2)
(B2) : [SMT ] = [(statistical) measurement]
(AxiomS 1)
+ [causality]
(Axiom 2)
where Axiom 2 is common in PMT and SMT. For completeness, note that measurement theory
(B) (i.e., (B1) and (B2)) is not physics but a kind of language based on “the quantum mechanical
world view”. As seen in [8], note that MT gives a foundation to statistics. That is, roughly
speaking,
(C1) it may be understandable to consider that PMT and SMT is related to Fisher’s statistics
and Bayesian statistics respectively.
When A = Bc(H), the C
∗-algebra composed of all compact operators on a Hilbert space
H, the (B) is called quantum measurement theory (or, quantum system theory), which can be
regarded as the linguistic aspect of quantum mechanics. Also, when A is commutative
(
that
is, when A is characterized by C0(Ω), the C
∗-algebra composed of all continuous complex-valued
functions vanishing at infinity on a locally compact Hausdorff space Ω (cf. [16])
)
, the (B) is called
classical measurement theory. Thus, we have the following classification:
(C2) MT


quantum MT (when A = Bc(H))
classical MT (when A = C0(Ω))
Also, for the position of MT in science, see Figure 1, which was precisely explained in [7, 10].
Parmenides
Socrates
Greek
philosophy
Plato
Alistotle
Schola-
−−−−−→
sticism
1©
−−→
(monism)
Newton
(realism)
2©
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relativity
theory −−−−−−→ 3©
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quantum
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Descartes
Rock,...
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language
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

5©
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everything
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10©
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quantum
language
(language)
Figure 1: The history of the world-view
statistics
system theory −−−−→ 9©
linguistic view
realistic view
2 Classical Measurement Theory (Axioms and Interpretation)
2.1 Mathematical Preparations
Since our concern is concentrated to the Monty Hall problem and three prisoners problem,
we devote ourselves to classical MT in (C2).
4Throughout this paper, we assume that Ω is a compact Hausdorff space. Thus, we can put
C0(Ω) = C(Ω), which is defined by a Banach space (or precisely, a commutative C
∗-algebra )
composed of all continuous complex-valued functions on a compact Hausdorff space Ω, where its
norm ‖f‖C(Ω) is defined by maxω∈Ω |f(ω)|.
Let C(Ω)∗ be the dual Banach space of C(Ω). That is, C(Ω)∗ = {ρ | ρ is a continu-
ous linear functional on C(Ω) }, and the norm ‖ρ‖C(Ω)∗ is defined by sup{|ρ(f)| : f ∈
C(Ω) such that ‖f‖C(Ω) ≤ 1}. The bi-linear functional ρ(f) is also denoted by C(Ω)∗〈ρ, f〉C(Ω),
or in short 〈ρ, f〉. Define the mixed state ρ (∈ C(Ω)∗) such that ‖ρ‖C(Ω)∗ = 1 and ρ(f) ≥
0 for all f ∈ C(Ω) such that f ≥ 0. And put
S
m(C(Ω)∗)={ρ ∈ C(Ω)∗ | ρ is a mixed state}.
Also, for each ω ∈ Ω, define the pure state δω (∈ S
m(C(Ω)∗)) such that C(Ω)∗〈δω, f〉C(Ω) = f(ω)
(∀f ∈ C(Ω)). And put
S
p(C(Ω)∗)={δω ∈ C(Ω)
∗ | δω is a pure state},
which is called a state space. Note, by the Riesz theorem (cf. [18] ), that C(Ω)∗ =M(Ω) ≡ {ρ | ρ
is a signed measure on Ω } and Sm(C(Ω)∗) = Mm+1(Ω) ≡ {ρ | ρ is a measure on Ω such that
ρ(Ω) = 1 }. Also, it is clear that Sp(C(Ω)∗) = {δω0 | δω0 is a point measure at ω0 ∈ Ω}, where∫
Ω f(ω)δω0(dω) = f(ω0) (∀f ∈ C(Ω)). This implies that the state space S
p(C(Ω)∗) can be also
identified with Ω (called a spectrum space or simply, spectrum) such as
S
p(C(Ω)∗)
(state space)
∋ δω ↔ ω ∈ Ω
(spectrum)
(1)
Also, note that C(Ω) is unital, i.e., it has the identity I (or precisely, IC(Ω)), since we assume
that Ω is compact.
According to the noted idea (cf. [1]) in quantum mechanics, an observable O :=(X,F , F ) in
C(Ω) is defined as follows:
(D1) [Field] X is a set, F(⊆ 2
X , the power set of X) is a field of X, that is, “Ξ1,Ξ2 ∈ F ⇒
Ξ1 ∪ Ξ2 ∈ F”, “Ξ ∈ F ⇒ X \ Ξ ∈ F ”.
(D2) [Additivity] F is a mapping from F to C(Ω) satisfying: (a): for every Ξ ∈ F , F (Ξ) is a
non-negative element in C(Ω) such that 0 ≤ F (Ξ) ≤ I, (b): F (∅) = 0 and F (X) = I, where
0 and I is the 0-element and the identity in C(Ω) respectively. (c): for any Ξ1, Ξ2 ∈ F such
that Ξ1 ∩ Ξ2 = ∅, it holds that F (Ξ1 ∪ Ξ2) = F (Ξ1) + F (Ξ2).
For the more precise argument (such as countably additivity, etc.), see [8].
2.2 Classical PMT in (B1)
In this section we shall explain classical PMT in (A1).
With any system S, a commutative C∗-algebra C(Ω) can be associated in which the measure-
ment theory (B) of that system can be formulated. A state of the system S is represented by
an element δω(∈ S
p(C(Ω)∗)) and an observable is represented by an observable O :=(X,F , F ) in
C(Ω). Also, the measurement of the observable O for the system S with the state δω is denoted
by MC(Ω)(O, S[δω ])
(
or more precisely, MC(Ω)(O :=(X,F , F ), S[δω ])
)
. An observer can obtain a
measured value x (∈ X) by the measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[δω ]).
5The AxiomP 1 presented below is a kind of mathematical generalization of Born’s probabilistic
interpretation of quantum mechanics. And thus, it is a statement without reality.
AxiomP 1 [Classical PMT]. The probability that a measured value x (∈ X) obtained by the
measurement MC(Ω)(O :=(X,F , F ), S[δω0 ]) belongs to a set Ξ(∈ F) is given by [F (Ξ)](ω0).
Next, we explain Axiom 2 in (B). Let (T,≤) be a tree, i.e., a partial ordered set such that
“t1 ≤ t3 and t2 ≤ t3” implies “t1 ≤ t2 or t2 ≤ t1”. In this paper, we assume that T is finite.
Assume that there exists an element t0 ∈ T , called the root of T , such that t0 ≤ t (∀t ∈ T ) holds.
Put T 2≤ = {(t1, t2) ∈ T
2 | t1 ≤ t2}. The family {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) → C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤
is called a
causal relation (due to the Heisenberg picture), if it satisfies the following conditions (E1) and
(E2).
(E1) With each t ∈ T , a C
∗-algebra C(Ωt) is associated.
(E2) For every (t1, t2) ∈ T
2
≤, a Markov operator Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2)→ C(Ωt1) is defined (i.e., Φt1,t2 ≥
0, Φt1,t2(IC(Ωt2 )) = IC(Ωt1 ) ). And it satisfies that Φt1,t2Φt2,t3 = Φt1,t3 holds for any (t1, t2),
(t2, t3) ∈ T
2
≤.
The family of dual operators {Φ∗t1,t2 : S
m(C(Ωt1)
∗) → Sm(C(Ωt2)
∗)}(t1 ,t2)∈T 2≤
is called a dual
causal relation (due to the Schro¨dinger picture). When Φ∗t1,t2 (S
p(C(Ωt1)
∗) ⊆ Sp(C(Ωt2)
∗) holds
for any (t1, t2) ∈ T
2
≤, the causal relation is said to be deterministic.
Here, Axiom 2 in the measurement theory (B) is presented as follows:
Axiom 2 [Causality]. The causality is represented by a causal relation {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) →
C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤
.
For the further argument (i.e., the W ∗-algebraic formulation) of measurement theory, see
Appendix in [6].
2.3 Classical SMT in (B2)
It is usual to consider that we do not know the state δω0 when we take a measurementMC(Ω)(O, S[δω0 ]).
That is because we usually take a measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[δω0 ]) in order to know the state δω0 .
Thus, when we want to emphasize that we do not know the the state δω0 , MC(Ω)(O, S[δω0 ]) is
denoted by MC(Ω)(O, S[∗]). Also, when we know the distribution ν0 (∈ M
m
+1(Ω) = S
m(C(Ω)∗))
of the unknown state δω0 , the MC(Ω)(O, S[δω0 ]) is denoted by MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν0)).
The AxiomS 1 presented below is a kind of mathematical generalization of AxiomP 1.
AxiomS 1 [Classical SMT]. The probability that a measured value x (∈ X) obtained by the
measurement MC(Ω)(O :=(X,F , F ), S[∗](ν0)) belongs to a set Ξ(∈ F) is given by ν0(F (Ξ)) (
= C(Ω)∗〈ν0, F (Ξ)〉C(Ω) ).
Remark 1. Note that two statistical measurements MC(Ω)(O, S[δω1 ](ν0)) and MC(Ω)(O, S[δω2 ](ν0))
can not be distinguished before measurements. In this sense, we consider that, even if ω1 6= ω2,
we can assume that
MC(Ω)(O, S[δω1 ](ν0)) = MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν0)) = MC(Ω)(O, S[δω2 ](ν0)). (2)
2.4 Linguistic Interpretation
Next, we have to answer how to use the above axioms as follows. That is, we present the following
linguistic interpretation (F) [=(F1)–(F3)], which is characterized as a kind of linguistic turn of
so-called Copenhagen interpretation (cf. [6, 7] ).
6That is, we propose:
(F1) Consider the dualism composed of “observer” and “system( =measuring object)” such as
•
observer
(I(=mind))
system
(matter)
✛
✲
observable
measured
value
a©interfere
b©perceive a reaction
state
Figure 2. Descartes’ figure in MT
And therefore, “observer” and “system” must be absolutely separated.
(F2) Only one measurement is permitted. And thus, the state after a measurement is meaningless
since it can not be measured any longer. Also, the causality should be assumed only in
the side of system, however, a state never moves. Thus, the Heisenberg picture should be
adopted.
(F3) Also, the observer does not have the space-time. Thus, the question: “When and where is
a measured value obtained?” is out of measurement theory,
and so on. This interpretation is, of course, common to both PMT and SMT.
2.5 Preliminary Fundamental Theorems
We have the following two fundamental theorems in measurement theory:
Theorem 1 [Fisher’s maximum likelihood method (cf. [8])]. Assume that a measured value
obtained by a measurement MC(Ω)(O := (X,F , F ), S[∗]) belongs to Ξ (∈ F). Then, there is a
reason to infer that the unknown state [∗] is equal to δω0 , where ω0 (∈ Ω) is defined by
[F (Ξ)](ω0) = max
ω∈Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω).
Theorem 2 [Bayes’ method (cf. [8])]. Assume that a measured value obtained by a statistical
measurement MC(Ω)(O := (X,F , F ), S[∗](ν0)) belongs to Ξ (∈ F). Then, there is a reason to infer
that the posterior state (i.e., the mixed state after the measurement ) is equal to νpost, which is
defined by
νpost(D) =
∫
D
[F (Ξ)](ω)ν0(dω)∫
Ω[F (Ξ)](ω)ν0(dω)
(∀D ∈ BΩ; Borel field).
The above two theorems are, of course, the most fundamental in statistics. Thus, we believe
in Figure 1, i.e.,
statistics −−−−−−−→
9©
10© quantum language
73 The First Answer to Monty Hall Problem [resp. Three pris-
oners problem] by Fisher’s method
In this section, we present the first answer to Problem 1 (Monty-Hall problem) [resp. Problem
2 (Three prisoners problem)] in classical PMT. The two will be simultaneously solved as follows.
The spirit of dualism (in Figure 2) urges us to declare that
(G) ”observer ≈ you” and ”system ≈ three doors” in Problem 1
[resp. ”observer ≈ prisoner A1” and ”system ≈ emperor’s mind” in Problem 2]
Put Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} with the discrete topology. Assume that each state δωm(∈ S
p(C(Ω)∗))
means
δωm ⇔ the state that the car is behind the door Am
[resp. δωm ⇔ the state that the prisoner Am will be free ]
(m = 1, 2, 3) (3)
Define the observable O1 ≡ ({1, 2, 3}, 2
{1,2,3} , F1) in C(Ω) such that
[F1({1})](ω1) = 0.0, [F1({2})](ω1) = 0.5, [F1({3})](ω1) = 0.5,
[F1({1})](ω2) = 0.0, [F1({2})](ω2) = 0.0, [F1({3})](ω2) = 1.0,
[F1({1})](ω3) = 0.0, [F1({2})](ω3) = 1.0, [F1({3})](ω3) = 0.0, (4)
where it is also possible to assume that F1({2})(ω1) = α, F1({3})(ω1) = 1 − α (0 < α < 1).
Thus we have a measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]), which should be regarded as the measurement
theoretical representation of the measurement that you say ”Door A1” [resp. ”Prisoner A1” asks
to the emperor ]. Here, we assume that
a) “measured value 1 is obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗])”
⇔ The host says “Door A1 has a goat”
[resp. ⇔ the emperor says “Prisoner A1 will be executed” ]
b) “measured value 2 is obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]) ”
⇔ The host says “Door A2 has a goat”
[resp. ⇔ the emperor says “Prisoner A2 will be executed” ]
c) “measured value 3 is obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]) ”
⇔ The host says “Door A3 has a goat”
[resp. ⇔ the emperor says “Prisoner A3 will be executed” ]
Recall that, in Problem 1 (Monty-Hall problem) [resp. Problem 2 (Three prisoners problem)], the
host said “Door 3 has a goat” [resp. the emperor said “Prisoner A3 wil be executed”] This implies
that you [resp. “Prisoner A1] get the measured value “3” by the measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]).
Note that
[F1({3})](ω2) = 1.0 = max{0.5, 1.0, 0.0}
= max{[F1({3})](ω1), [F1({3})](ω2), [F1({3})](ω3)}, (5)
Therefore, Theorem 1 (Fisher’s maximum likelihood method) says that
(H1) In Problem 1 (Monty-Hall problem), there is a reason to infer that [∗] = δω2 . Thus, you
should switch to Door A2.
8(H2) In Problem 2 (Three prisoners problem), there is a reason to infer that [∗] = δω2 . However,
there is no reasonable answer for the question: whether Prisoner A1’s happiness increases.
That is, Problem 2 is not a well-posed problem.
4 The Second Answer to Monty Hall Problem [resp. Three
prisoners problem] by Bayes’ method
In order to use Bayes’ method, shall modify Problem 1(Monty Hall problem) and Problem 2(Three
prisoners problem) as follows.
4.1 Problems 1′ and 2′ ( Monty Hall Problem [resp. Three prisoners problem]
)
Problem 1′ [Monty Hall problem; the host casts the dice]. Suppose you are on a game show,
and you are given the choice of three doors (i.e., “Door A1”, “Door A2”, “Door A3”). Behind one
door is a car, behind the others, goats. You do not know what’s behind the doors.
However, you pick a door, say ”Door A1”, and the host, who knows what’s behind the doors,
opens another door, say “Door A3”, which has a goat. And he adds that
(♯1) the car was set behind the door decided by the cast of the (distorted) dice. That is, the host
set the car behind Door Am with probability pm (where p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, 0 ≤ p1, p2, p3 ≤ 1
).
He says to you, “Do you want to pick Door A2?” Is it to your advantage to switch your choice
of doors?
❄ ❄ ❄
Door A1 Door A2 Door A3
Problem 2′ [Three prisoners problem; the emperor casts the dice]. Three prisoners, A1, A2, and
A3 were in jail. They knew that one of them was to be set free and the other two were to be
executed. They did not know who was the one to be spared, but they know that
(♯2) the one to be spared was decided by the cast of the (distorted) dice. That is, Prisoner Am
is to be spared with probability pm (where p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, 0 ≤ p1, p2, p3 ≤ 1 ).
but the emperor did know the one to be spared. A1 said to the emperor, “I already know that
at least one the other two prisoners will be executed, so if you tell me the name of one who
will be executed, you won’t have given me any information about my own execution”. After
some thinking, the emperor said, “A3 will be executed.” Thereupon A1 felt happier because his
chance had increased from 13(=Num[{A1,A2,A3}]) to
1
2(=Num[{A1,A2}])
. This prisoner A1’s happiness
may or may not be reasonable?
9E A1 A2 A3
✲ ✲
“A3 will be executed”
(Emperor)
Remark 2. In Problem 1′, you may choose ”Door A1” by various ways. For example, you may
choose ”Door A1” by the method mentioned in Problem 1
′′ later.
4.2 The second answer to Problems 1′ and 2′ ( Monty Hall Problem [resp.
Three prisoners problem] ) by Bayes’ method
In what follows we study these problems. Let Ω and O1 be as in Section 3 . Under the hypothesis
(♯1) [resp. (♯2)], define the mixed state ν0 ( ∈ M
m
+1(Ω)) such that:
ν0({ω1}) = p1, ν0({ω2}) = p2, ν0({ω3}) = p3 (6)
Thus we have a statistical measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗](ν0)). Note that
a) “measured value 1 is obtained by the statistical measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗](ν0))”
⇔ the host says “Door A1 has a goat”
[resp. ⇔ the emperor says “Prisoner A1 will be executed” ]
b) “measured value 2 is obtained by the statistical measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗](ν0))”
⇔ the host says “Door A2 has a goat”
[resp. ⇔ the emperor says “Prisoner A2 will be executed” ]
c) “measured value 3 is obtained by the statistical measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗](ν0))”
⇔ the host says “Door A3 has a goat”
[resp. ⇔ the emperor says “Prisoner A3 will be executed” ]
Here, assume that, by the statistical measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗](ν0)), you obtain a measured
value 3, which corresponds to the fact that the host said “Door A3 has a goat”. [resp. the
emperor said that Prisoner A3 is to be executed ], Then, Theorem 2 (Bayes’ method) says that
the posterior state νpost ( ∈ M
m
+1(Ω)) is given by
νpost =
F1({3}) × ν0〈
ν0, F1({3})
〉 . (7)
That is,
νpost({ω1}) =
p1
2
p1
2 + p2
, νpost({ω2}) =
p2
p1
2 + p2
, νpost({ω3}) = 0. (8)
Then,
10
(I1) In Problem 1′,


if νpost({ω1}) < νpost({ω2}) (i.e., p1 < 2p2), you should pick Door A2
if νpost({ω1}) = νpost({ω2}) (i.e., p1 < 2p2), you may pick Doors A1 or A2
if νpost({ω1}) > νpost({ω2}) (i.e., p1 < 2p2), you should not pick Door A2
(I2) In Problem 2′,


if ν0({ω1}) < νpost({ω1}) (i.e., p1 < 1− 2p2), the prisoner A1’s happiness increases
if ν0({ω1}) = νpost({ω1}) (i.e., p1 = 1− 2p2), the prisoner A1’s happiness is invariant
if ν0({ω1}) > νpost({ω1}) (i.e., p1 > 1− 2p2), the prisoner A1’s happiness decreases
5 The Principle of Equal Probability
In this section, according to [4, 6, 11] we prepare Theorem 3 (the principle of equal probability),
i.e.,
(J) unless we have sufficient reason to regard one possible case as more probable than another,
we treat them as equally probable.
This theorem will be used in the following section.
Put Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, . . . , ωn} with the discrete topology. And consider any observable O1 ≡
(X,F , F1) in C(Ω).
Define the bijection φ1 : Ω→ Ω such that
φ1(ωj) =
{
ωj+1 (j 6= n)
ω1 (j = n)
and define the observable Ok ≡ (X,F , Fk) in C(Ω) such that
[Fk(Ξ)](ω) = [F1(Ξ)](φk−1(ω))
(∀ω ∈ Ω, k = 1, 2, ..., n)
where φ0(ω) = ω(∀ ∈ Ω) and φk(ω) = φ1(φk−1(ω)) (∀ω ∈ Ω, k = 1, 2, ..., n).
Let pk(k = 1, ..., n) be a non-negative real number such that
∑n
k=1 pk = 1.
(K) For example, fix a state δωm (m = 1, 2, ..., n). And, by the cast of the ( distorted ) dice,
you choose an observable Ok ≡ (X,F , Fk) with probability pk. And further, you take a
measurement MC(Ω)(Ok := (X,F , Fk), S[δωm ]).
Here, we can easily see that the probability that a measured value obtained by the measurement
(K) belongs to Ξ(∈ F) is given by
n∑
k=1
pk〈Fk(Ξ), δωm〉
(
=
n∑
k=1
pk[Fk(Ξ)](ωm)
)
(9)
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which is equal to 〈F1(Ξ),
∑n
k=1 pkδφk−1(ωm)〉. This implies that the measurement (K) is equivalent
to a statistical measurement MC(Ω)(O1 := (X,F , F1), S[δωm ](
∑n
k=1 pkδφk−1(ωm))). Note that the
(9) depends on the state δm. Thus, we can not calculate the (9) such as the (8).
However, if it holds that pk = 1/n (k = 1, ..., n), we see that
1
n
∑n
k=1 δφk−1(ωm) is independent
of the choice of the state δωm . Thus, putting
1
n
∑n
k=1 δφk−1(ωm) = νe, we see that the measurement
(K) is equivalent to the statistical measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[δωm ](νe)), which is also equivalent
to MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗](νe)) (from the formula (2) in Remark 1).
Thus, under the above notation, we have the following theorem, which realizes the spirit (J).
Theorem 3 [ The principle of equal probability (i.e., the equal probability of selection) ]. If
pk = 1/n (k = 1, ..., n), the measurement (K) is independent of the choice of the state δm. Hence,
the (K) is equivalent to a statistical measurement MC(Ω)(O1 := (X,F , F1), S[∗](νe)).
It should be noted that the principle of equal probability is not ”principle” but ”theorem” in
measurement theory.
Remark 3. In the above argument, we consider the set B′ = {φk | k = 1, 2, ..., n}. However, it
may be more natural to consider the set B = {φ | φ : Ω→ Ω is a bijection}.
6 The Third Answer to Monty Hall Problem [resp. Three pris-
oners problem] by the principle of equal probability
6.1 Problems 1′′ and 2′′ ( Monty Hall Problem [resp. Three prisoners problem]
)
Problem 1′′ [Monty Hall problem; you cast the dice]. Suppose you are on a game show, and
you are given the choice of three doors (i.e., “Door A1”, “Door A2”, “Door A3”). Behind one door
is a car, behind the others, goats. You do not know what’s behind the doors. Thus,
(♯1) you select Door A1 by the cast of the fair dice. That is, you say ”Door A1” with probability
1/3.
The host, who knows what’s behind the doors, opens another door, say “Door A3”, which has a
goat. He says to you, “Do you want to pick Door A2?” Is it to your advantage to switch your
choice of doors?
❄ ❄ ❄
Door A1 Door A2 Door A3
Problem 2′′ [Three prisoners problem; the prisoners cast the dice]. Three prisoners, A1, A2, and
A3 were in jail. They knew that one of them was to be set free and the other two were to be
executed. They did not know who was the one to be spared, but the emperor did know. Since
three prisoners wanted to ask the emperor,
(♯2) the questioner was decided by the fair die throw. And Prisoner A1 was selected with proba-
bility 1/3
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Then, A1 said to the emperor, “I already know that at least one the other two prisoners will
be executed, so if you tell me the name of one who will be executed, you won’t have given me
any information about my own execution”. After some thinking, the emperor said, “A3 will be
executed.” Thereupon A1 felt happier because his chance had increased from
1
3(=Num[{A1,A2,A3}])
to 12(=Num[{A1,A2}]) . This prisoner A1’s happiness may or may not be reasonable?
E A1 A2 A3
✲ ✲
“A3 will be executed”
(Emperor)
Answer: By Theorem 3 (The principle of equal probability), the above Problems 1′′ and 2′′ is
respectively the same as Problems 1′ and 2′ in the case that p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/3. Then, the
formulas (6) and (8) say that
(L1) In Problem 1′′, since νpost({ω1}) = 1/3 < 2/3 = νpost({ω2}), you should pick Door A2.
(L2) In Problem 2′′, since ν0({ω1}) = 1/3 = νpost({ω1}), the prisoner A1’s happiness is invariant.
7 Conclusions
Although main idea is due to refs. [5, 11], in this paper we simultaneously discussed the Monty
Hall problem and the three prisoners problem in terms of quantum language. That is, we gave
three answers, i.e.,
(M1) the first answer (due to Fisher’s method) in Section 3,
(M2) the second answer (due to Bayes’ method) in Section 4,
(M3) the third answer (due to Theorem 3(the principle of equal probability)) in Section 6
We of course believe that our proposal is the final solutions of the two problems. It should be
noted that both the Monty Hall problem and the three prisoners problem are never elementary,
and they can not be solved without the deep understanding of ”probability” and ”dualism (G)”.
Thus in this paper, we answered the question:
”Why have philosophers continued to stick to these problems?”
We hope that our assertion will be examined from various view points.
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